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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a symposium proceeding from the assumption that some of the 
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States have been 
notorious mistakes, one would hope to find some collective understanding 
about governing principles.  If, as I suspect, there will be little agreement 
about which decisions (and accompanying opinions) qualify as notorious,  
perhaps there will be greater agreement about evaluative criteria.  For 
example, even if one might not expect to find consensus about whether Roe 
v. Wade1 was a notorious mistake, one might at least anticipate a shared 
sense, among those searching for such mistakes, of how the search might 
proceed.  But what might that shared sense include?  And can we fashion 
any durable criteria for determining notoriety?  This essay investigates those 
questions. 
The essay proceeds in three stages.  First, I identify two cases out of a 
handful that would be on many commentators’ lists of notorious mistakes, 
and at the same time identify some largely implicit criteria that have 
typically affected the analysis of judicial opinions in America.  I then 
 
 *   David Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law and University Professor, University 
of Virginia School of Law.  This essay is part of Pepperdine Law Review’s April 1, 2011 Supreme 
Mistakes symposium, exploring the most maligned decisions in Supreme Court history.  A version of 
this paper was presented on August 26, 2011, in the University of Virginia School of Law’s faculty 
workshop series.  Thanks to my colleagues for their comments on that draft. 
 1.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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suggest that those criteria can serve to determine notoriety, but that they bear 
a particular relationship to one another, one that may not be well understood.  
Understanding that relationship, I argue, is critical to the process of 
assigning notoriety to Supreme Court decisions. 
Next I argue that because the criteria can serve to reinforce one another 
and also to oppose one another, evaluators of Supreme Court decisions are 
required to prioritize among them, or even choose some over others.  The 
need to prioritize among multiple criteria that point in different directions 
makes the evaluative process highly dependent on the weight assigned to a 
particular criterion.  The process of assigning notoriety thus runs the risk of 
collapsing into subjectivity because individual evaluators might simply be 
assigning greater or lesser weight to one criterion or another. 
The third stage of the essay seeks to restore some integrity to the criteria 
for determining notoriety.  In this stage I use a decision rarely placed on 
anyone’s list of mistakes, United States v. Carolene Products Co.,2 to 
illustrate that the choice to label a particular decision notorious amounts to a 
choice to treat criteria that are often self-opposing as self-reinforcing.  The 
notorious decision ends up being one that is characterized as 
transcendentally mistaken.  Not only is it on the “wrong” side of history, it 
gets no discount for the historical context in which it was decided.3 
II.  EXAMPLES OF NOTORIOUS MISTAKES: A FIRST LOOK 
In the long history of Supreme Court jurisprudence, a small number of 
cases have been consistently identified as notorious mistakes by 
commentators.  Those cases need to be distinguished from a much larger 
group of cases that were severely criticized at the time they were decided but 
over the years have secured a degree of acceptance.  Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee,4 McCulloch v. Maryland,5 Brown v. Board of Education,6 and 
Miranda v. Arizona7 are in the larger group of cases.  The smaller group 
seems to include only a few cases, which appear to be distinguished by the 
fact that successive generations of commentators have continued to regard 
them as notorious.  What gives those cases their notoriety?  Perhaps a 
comparison of two cases regularly placed on the list of notorious mistakes 
will aid us in that inquiry. 
 
 2.  304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 3.  I will subsequently say more about what I mean by “transcendentally mistaken” decisions, 
and by “historical discounting.” 
 4.  14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 5.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 6.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 7.  384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
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Dred Scott v. Sandford8 and Korematsu v. United States9 are likely to 
appear on nearly everyone’s list of notorious mistakes.10  Some sense of why 
can be gleaned from a characterization of Dred Scott by David Currie in 
1985, and of Korematsu in a 1982 Congressional report on that case.  Currie 
described Dred Scott as “bad policy and bad judicial politics . . . [and] also 
bad law.”11  The Congressional report stated that Korematsu had been 
“overruled in the court of history.”12  Taken together, those characterizations 
of Dred Scott and Korematsu suggest that four characteristics have been 
attributed to notorious decisions: misguided outcomes, a flawed institutional 
stance on the part of the Court, deficient analytical reasoning, and being “on 
the wrong side” of history with respect to their cultural resonance.   
The Dred Scott decision concluded that African-American slaves and 
their descendants were not “citizens of the United States” and hence 
ineligible to sue in the federal courts.13  The decision further concluded that 
Congress could not outlaw slavery in federal territories because to do so 
would constitute an interference with the Fifth Amendment property rights 
of slaveholders.14  The Korematsu decision allowed the federal government 
to evacuate American citizens of Japanese origin from the West Coast, 
where they were detained in internment centers during the course of World 
War II, even though the sole basis of their evacuation and detention was 
their national origin, and even though Americans of German or Italian 
extraction were not comparably treated.15  Thus, Dred Scott committed the 
Court to the propositions that the Constitution protected the “rights” of 
humans to own other humans as property, and that African-Americans 
descended from slaves were a “degraded race” not worthy of United States 
citizenship, whereas Korematsu committed the Court to the proposition that 
American citizens of a particular ethnic origin could be summarily 
incarcerated by the government simply because of their ethnicity.  Those 
 
 8.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 9.  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 10.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Korematsu v. United States: A Tragedy Hopefully Never to 
Be Repeated, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 163 (2011); Daniel A. Farber, A Fatal Loss of Balance: Dred Scott 
Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 13 (2011); Paul Finkelman, Coming to Terms with Dred Scott: A 
Response to Daniel A. Farber, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 49 (2011); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Explaining 
Korematsu: A Response to Dean Chemerinsky, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 173 (2011). 
 11.  DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS, 1789–1888, at 264 (1985). 
 12.  COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE 
DENIED 238 (1997). 
 13.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 404. 
 14.  Id. at 451. 
 15.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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propositions, as policy statements, seem blatantly at odds with the 
foundational principles of American civilization that all persons are created 
equal and may not be arbitrarily deprived of their liberty by the state. 
The outcomes reached in Dred Scott and Korematsu appear to suggest 
that the Court found the policies of slavery and discrimination on the basis 
of ethnicity to be constitutionally legitimate.  The decisions could also be 
seen as reflecting an inappropriate institutional stance by the Court with 
respect to its role of determining the constitutionality of the actions of other 
branches of government. 
In Dred Scott the Court was asked to decide whether an African-
American slave who had been taken by his owner into a federal territory 
where slavery was not permitted, and then “voluntarily” returned to a slave 
state, could sue for his freedom in federal court.16  A majority of the Court 
found that African-American slaves were ineligible to sue in federal court.17  
That finding made any inquiry into the constitutional status of slavery in the 
federal territories irrelevant to the decision, but Chief Justice Roger Taney’s 
opinion, which was characterized as the “opinion of the court,” went on to 
conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which 
according to Taney protected the property rights of slave owners, prevented 
Congress from abolishing slavery in the territories.18 
The interaction of slavery and westward expansion has been recognized 
as one of the most deeply contested political issues of the antebellum period.  
The power of Congress to decide the status of slavery in federal territories 
had been acknowledged by supporters and opponents of slavery ever 1789, 
when Congress divided land acquired from Virginia, North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, New York, and Connecticut into “northwest” and “southwest” 
portions, with the Ohio River serving as a boundary, and outlawed slavery in 
the northwest section while remaining silent on it in the southwest section.19 
As slavery became a polarizing national issue in the early nineteenth 
century, it was generally conceded that although the federal government had 
no power to abolish slavery in states, it appeared to retain that power in 
federal territories.20  All of the political compromises related to the westward 
expansion of slavery that were fashioned by Congress between 1820 and 
1850 proceeded on that assumption.  Moreover, as the United States 
acquired a vast amount of new territory between 1803 and 1853, the attitude 
 
 16.  “Voluntary” is meant in the sense that the slave in question was not a fugitive from his or 
her owner, having returned in the company of the owner or, in Dred Scott’s case, the owner’s wife.  
See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 398. 
 17.  Id. at 399, 404. 
 18.  Id. at 451. 
 19.  For more detail, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 276–85 (1977); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A 
HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 361–62 (2009). 
 20.  WIECEK, supra note 19, at 16, 93, 102–04. 
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of Congress toward slavery in portions of that territory was thought to 
foreshadow the attitude of residents of those portions when states formed 
from them sought to enter the Union.  The process by which Congress gave 
permission to new states to enter the Union was heavily influenced by 
expectations about whether the states would be free or slave, and those 
expectations were influenced by Congress’s treatment of slavery in the 
portions of territory from which prospective states were carved out.21 
By reaching out to decide the constitutional status of slavery in the 
federal territories in Dred Scott, the Taney Court treated the delicate 
balancing of free and slave territories, and free and slave states, as if it had 
been based on an erroneous assumption.  Suddenly, Congress had no power 
to outlaw slavery in any federal territory.22  That conclusion represented a 
dramatic intervention by the Court in an extremely sensitive political issue 
that Congress had sought to keep in equipoise.  Moreover, the intervention 
was not necessary to the decision in Dred Scott. 
Taney’s conclusion that Congress had no power to outlaw slavery in the 
federal territories rested on two propositions.  First, he announced that 
Congress’s constitutional power to make rules and regulations for federal 
territories23 extended only to territory within the United States in 1789.24  
Second, he maintained that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
protected property in slaves.25  Both propositions were novel.  
Taney’sreading of the Territories Clause of the Constitution would have 
prevented Congress from exercising any of its enumerated powers outside 
the original thirteen states,26 and Taney’s interpretation of the Due Process 
Clause could not easily be squared with federal or state bans on the 
international or interstate slave trade, both of which were in place at the time 
of Dred Scott.27 
In short, Dred Scott can be seen as reaching a pernicious result, 
representing a categorical judicial resolution of an issue long regarded as 
deeply contested in the political branches of government, and resting on 
some dubious legal arguments.  In addition, it was described as a mistake by 
 
 21.  For support for the observations in the above paragraph, see WIECEK, supra note 19. 
 22.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 441–42. 
 23.  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 24.  Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 441–42. 
 25.  Id. at 451. 
 26.  See CURRIE, supra note 11, at 269; DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS 
SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 367–68 (1978). 
 27.  CURRIE, supra note 11, at 271–72. 
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contemporaries,28 the Republican Party adopted a platform in the 1860 
election pledging to continue to outlaw slavery in federal territories in 
defiance of the decision,29 and it was explicitly overruled by the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.30 
One could construct a similar analysis of the Korematsu decision.  It  
gave constitutional legitimacy to the incarceration of large numbers of 
American residents of Japanese descent simply on the basis of their 
ethnicity.  The internment program made no effort to distinguish aliens from 
citizens or Japanese loyal to the United States from those loyal to Japan.31  
Internments were of indefinite duration.  They were often accompanied by 
the confiscation of property owned by Japanese residents.  Detainees could 
not challenge their detentions through writs of habeas corpus.  And even 
though Justice Hugo Black’s opinion for the Court asserted that Japanese 
residents of the West Coast were “not [interned] because of [their] race” but 
“because we are at war with the Japanese Empire,”32 the United States was 
also at war with Germany and Italy at the time, and few residents of German 
or Italian descent were interned during the course of that war. 
Whereas the Court’s posture with respect to other branches of 
government in Dred Scott might be described as awkwardly interventionist, 
its institutional posture in Korematsu might be described as awkwardly 
supine.  The Court in Korematsu merely posited that military authorities had 
determined that allowing Japanese to remain on the West Coast posed 
threats of espionage and sabotage because Japan might invade the West 
Coast, and that relocating all Japanese to internment centers was necessary 
because there was no easy way to distinguish “loyal” from “disloyal” 
members of the Japanese population.33  Although the Korematsu majority 
maintained that “legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect,” and courts “must subject them to the 
most rigid scrutiny,”34 it arguably did not subject the restrictions on Japanese 
residents of the West Coast to any scrutiny at all.  It simply noted that 
exclusion of “the whole group [of Japanese]”35 from the West Coast was 
justified because of military authorities’ concerns about espionage and 
sabotage by the Japanese on the West Coast, and their inability to “bring 
about an immediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal.”36  The 
 
 28.  For a sample of negative contemporary reactions to the Dred Scott decision, see 2 CHARLES 
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1836–1918, at 302–19 (1926). 
 29.  JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 227 (1988). 
 30.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1. 
 31.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 32.  Id. at 223. 
 33.  Id. at 219. 
 34.  Id. at 216. 
 35.  Id. at 219. 
 36.  Id. 
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Korematsu majority made no effort to determine whether military authorities 
had attempted to ascertain the loyalty of particular Japanese, or whether they 
had attempted to detain Germans or Italians anywhere in the United States.  
Instead, it concluded that the military authorities who ordered Japanese 
residents on the West Coast to leave their homes and report to “Assembly 
Centers,” the first stage in their internment, were justified in doing so 
because they “considered that the need for action was great, and time was 
short.”37 
The legal arguments mounted by Black for the Korematsu majority were 
no more statured than those employed by Taney in Dred Scott.  Although 
Black rhetorically endorsed strict scrutiny for acts restricting the civil rights 
of racial minorities, he failed to subject the internment policy to searching 
review while denying that the internment policy was racially motivated.  
Justice Robert Jackson pointed out in dissent that the standard of review 
implemented by Black’s opinion—whether the military reasonably believed 
that one of its policies was justified by a grave, imminent danger to public 
safety—could not realistically be applied by courts.38  Moreover, the 
Korematsu Court had not heard any evidence on what the military believed 
or whether they could distinguish loyal from disloyal Japanese.  It would 
subsequently be revealed that most of the basis for the internment order 
rested on stereotyped assumptions about the “unassimilated” status of 
Japanese communities in America rather than on military necessity, and 
government officials concealed this evidence from the Court.39 
Part of the reason that Korematsu would be “overruled in the court of 
history” resulted from the Court’s subsequent implementation of the strict 
scrutiny standard for racial classifications proposed by Black in a series of 
cases reviewing classifications of African-Americans on the basis of their 
race.40  Once the Court began to put some teeth into its review of policies 
affecting the civil rights of racial minorities, its rhetorical posture in 
Korematsu appeared disingenuous.  In addition, the factors that led to the 
internment policy being formulated and upheld (uninformed stereotyping of 
a racial minority by military and civilian officials and reflexive deference on 
the part of the Court to the decisions of military officials in times of war) 
suggested that unless the Court actually followed through on its promise to 
subject racial discrimination to exacting scrutiny, the Korematsu precedent 
 
 37.  Id. at 223–24. 
 38.  Id. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 39.  See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 186–218 (1983). 
 40.  See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). 
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might become, as Jackson put it, “a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any 
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”41 
III.  CHARACTERISTICS OF “MISTAKEN” DECISIONS: A FURTHER ANALYSIS 
Dred Scott and Korematsu thus share pernicious outcomes, a 
questionable institutional stance on the part of the Court, flawed legal 
reasoning, and, over time, a location on the wrong side of history.  At first 
glance those criteria might appear to be useful baselines for identifying 
notorious Supreme Court decisions, but a closer look at the criteria suggests 
that three of them seem heavily dependent on the fourth. 
Suppose one were to make some assumptions about the Dred Scott and 
Korematsu decisions that numerous contemporaries of those decisions made.  
Suppose, with respect to Dred Scott, one believed that slavery was a creation 
of positive law, so that if states chose to permit it, they created “property 
rights” in slaveholders.  Suppose further that it was understood that slave 
status was a matter for states to decide, and other states and the federal 
government needed to respect those decisions.  Both those assumptions were 
in place at the time of the Dred Scott decision42 and were part of the reason 
why Congress and a series of antebellum presidents attempted to maintain a 
precise equilibrium between slave states and free states as new public lands 
states entered the Union.  In this setting, the idea that Congress could outlaw 
slavery in all of the territory acquired by the United States between 1803 and 
1853—an area that more than doubled the size of the nation—was 
threatening to states with sizable slave populations.  For example, in 1846, 
when President James K. Polk requested a congressional appropriation for 
funds to purchase lands from Mexico as part of a settlement to the Mexican 
War, David Wilmot, a Congressman from Pennsylvania, sought to attach a 
proviso to the appropriation that slavery would not be permitted in any of the 
territory acquired.43 
Thus, contemporaries of the Dred Scott decision might well have 
thought that granting power to Congress to abolish slavery in federal 
territories would result in much of the newly acquired territory being “free,” 
and thus, over time, the balance between slave states and free states in 
Congress being disrupted.44  Many residents of slave states believed that it 
was a small step from that situation to an antislavery majority in Congress 
seeking to abolish slavery in the states.45  When the 1860 presidential 
platform of the Republican Party defied Dred Scott’s conclusion that slavery 
 
 41.  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 42.  See WIECEK, supra note 19, at 38–39, 276–77. 
 43.  DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICA, 1815–1848, at 767–68 (2007). 
 44.  MCPHERSON, supra note 29, at 190, 230, 232. 
 45.  Id. at 232. 
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could not constitutionally be banned in federal territories, and Lincoln and a 
Republican congressional majority prevailed in the 1860 election, the 
Southern states who seceded from the Union stated that they were doing so 
because they believed that Congress would eventually seek to force them to 
abolish slavery.46 
In addition, antebellum constitutional jurisprudence had a strong 
tradition of protection for “vested” rights of property.  Once one assumed 
that humans could legitimately be “owned” by other humans, the idea that 
Congress or a state legislature could take away the property rights of 
slaveholders seemed no different, conceptually, than other legislative 
appropriations of property that were inconsistent with the vested rights 
principle.  It was one thing for citizens of a state to decide, collectively, that 
they did not want to hold slaves as property.  It was another for slaveholders 
to have their ownership rights in slaves dissolved merely because they had 
become residents of a federal territory.47 
Finally, by the time Dred Scott was heard by the Court, Congress had 
demonstrated that it was no longer capable of containing the sectional 
tension that had resulted from the interaction of slavery with westward 
expansion.  In the place of the Compromise of 1850’s retention of the 
calibrated balance between slave and free states in the Union, Congress had 
substituted, in the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 1854, the idea that “popular 
sovereignty” would govern the treatment of slavery in federal territories 
aspiring to become states.48  The results were the appearance of competing 
pro- and anti-slavery legislatures and constitutions in Kansas, subsequent 
violence in that state, and the prospect that the entire mass of western federal 
territory might be subjected to similar treatment. In this atmosphere a 
definitive constitutional treatment of the status of slavery in federal 
territories may have seemed a welcome solution to many contemporaries of 
the Dred Scott case.49  Justice James Wayne advanced this argument in a 
memorandum to the Taney Court urging the Justices to take the occasion of 
Dred Scott to rule on the constitutionality of slavery in the federal 
territories.50 
 
 46.  Id. at 243–45. 
 47.  See WIECEK, supra note 19, at 279, 283 (quoting resolutions by Southerners in 1850 and 
1860, affirming protection from the property rights of slaveholders against interference by the 
federal government). 
 48.  See 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
TANEY PERIOD, 1836–64, at 596 (1874). 
 49.  See SWISHER, supra note 48, at 592–99. 
 50.  Id. at 619 (citing letter from John A. Campbell, Supreme Court Justice, to George T. Curtis, 
co-counsel for Dred Scott (Oct. 30, 1879) (on file with the University of Virginia Library)). 
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If one emphasizes those antebellum assumptions about slavery and its 
political and constitutional status, the Court’s intervention in Dred Scott 
becomes more explicable and more consistent with American constitutional 
jurisprudence at the time.  One should recall that the Constitution interpreted 
in Dred Scott had all its “proslavery” provisions intact and that no major 
political candidate, including Lincoln, was advocating for the abolition of 
slavery in states where it had become established.51  With this in mind, it is 
possible to see Dred Scott as a case not about the constitutional legitimacy of 
slavery itself, but about the constitutional legitimacy of extending slavery 
into federal territories.  Were persons such as Dr. John Emerson, the owner 
of Dred Scott, and his wife to be at risk of losing their property every time 
they took up residence in a federal territory?  If slavery was to prove 
economically viable in the territory acquired by the United States after the 
Mexican War, could Congress prevent it from taking root there?  Faced with 
those possibly dire uncertainties, the Court in Dred Scott sought to settle the 
matter.52 
The decision in Dred Scott thus can be deemed pernicious only if one 
concludes that a number of the decision’s contemporary observers were 
radically wrong about the legitimacy of humans owning other humans as 
property, so that all the antebellum common law decisions, statutes, and 
constitutional provisions treating slavery as legitimate were entitled to no 
legal weight.  That is what successive generations of Americans after Dred 
Scott have concluded.  But that fact only shows that Dred Scott was on the 
wrong side of history.  It does not provide support for the other criteria 
associated with notorious Supreme Court decisions. 
To be sure, one could criticize the Court’s aggressively interventionist 
stance in Dred Scott, and some of Taney’s arguments in the opinion, as 
analytically flawed.53  But many Supreme Court opinions have been 
criticized for undue activism or for inept reasoning.  Dred Scott’s notoriety 
rests on something different: it upheld the constitutional legitimacy of 
slavery and suggested that African-Americans were an inferior class of 
beings.  Once one restores a sufficient amount of historical context to show 
that both of those attitudes were part of the discourse of antebellum 
constitutional jurisprudence, the notoriety of Dred Scott initially seems to 
rest on its being on the wrong side of history. 
A similar analysis is possible for Korematsu.  For many years Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, who had been one of the architects of the internment 
 
 51.  For more detail on Lincoln’s position, which deplored slavery as a moral evil, opposed its 
spread into new federal territories, hoped for its eventual abolition, but indicated that he would not 
interfere with slavery in states where it existed, see MCPHERSON, supra note 29, at 181–88. 
 52.  For evidence that the Justices on the Taney Court broadened the inquiry in Dred Scott to 
include ruling on the constitutionality of slavery in federal territories, see SWISHER, supra note 48, at 
611–19. 
 53.  See CURRIE, supra note 11, at 265–69. 
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policy during his years as Attorney General and Governor of California, and 
Justices Black and Douglas, who had joined the majority in Korematsu, were 
unrepentant in their defense of the decision despite its apparent 
inconsistency with their willingness to protect the civil rights of minorities 
as members of the Warren Court.54  In their defense of Korematsu, those 
Justices suggested that their critics needed to recall the decision’s context.  
The United States Navy had been attacked by Japan at Pearl Harbor, and for 
two years after that attack, the Japanese navy appeared to be in control of the 
Pacific.  Japanese submarines had been observed off the West Coast.  Unlike 
German and Italian residents of America, Japanese residents were thought to 
be disinclined to assimilate into the general population, living in closely-knit 
communities and retaining Japanese as their first language.55  Many first-
generation Japanese citizens had close relatives in Japan, and some traveled 
back and forth between Japan and the United States.56 
Warren, Black, and Douglas maintained that in this setting it was 
difficult for civilian authorities on the West Coast, most of whom did not 
speak Japanese, to determine the loyalty of the resident Japanese population.  
Warren recalled that numerous Japanese were engaged in the commercial 
fishing industry, resulting in fishing boats operated by Japanese regularly 
venturing into Pacific waters.57  Warren was engaged with civil defense 
issues as Attorney General and Governor, and he and his staff worried that 
fishing boats manned by Japanese residents of America could be employed 
to flash signals to Japanese submarines, or possibly portions of the Japanese 
fleet, stationed off of the coast.58  It seemed at the time, Warren recalled, that 
 
 54.  See G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 75–76 (1982) [hereinafter WHITE, 
EARL WARREN].  As late as 1962, Warren defended the internment policy.  See Earl Warren, The 
Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 192 (1962). 
 55.  See WHITE, EARL WARREN, supra note 54, at 75. 
 56.  In Hirabayashi v. United States, a case testing the constitutionality of the curfew orders 
confining Japanese-Americans on the West Coast to their homes between the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 
6:00 a.m., Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s opinion, for a unanimous Court, contained the 
following paragraph: 
There is support for the view that social, economic and political conditions which have 
prevailed since the close of the last century, when the Japanese began to come to this 
country in substantial numbers, have intensified their solidarity and have in large measure 
prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white population.  In addition, large 
numbers of children of Japanese parentage are sent to Japanese language schools outside 
the regular hours of public schools in the locality.  Some of these schools are generally 
believed to be sources of Japanese nationalistic propaganda, cultivating allegiance to 
Japan.  Considerable numbers, estimated to be approximately 10,000, of American-born 
children of Japanese parentage have been sent to Japan for all or a part of their education. 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 96–97 (1943) (citations omitted). 
 57.  EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 148 (1977). 
 58.  Id. 
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potential sabotage or espionage could be forestalled by moving the resident 
Japanese population away from where they might have access to Japanese 
forces in the Pacific.59 
In defending their role in implementing and sustaining the internment of 
Japanese residents of the West Coast, none of the Justices openly suggested 
that German or Italian residents were perceived of as less of a security threat 
than those of Japanese extraction, despite the fact that there were German 
submarines stationed off the Atlantic Coast.  But both those populations had 
been in America far longer than Japanese residents, who had only come to 
the United States in substantial numbers in the early twentieth century and 
who were mainly located on the West Coast.60  Americans had far greater 
linguistic familiarity with German and Italian than with Japanese.  At the 
time the United States entered World War II, few Americans had 
encountered Japanese students in public schools or colleges.  There were 
reasons for contemporaries of the Korematsu decision to believe the 
stereotype of “unassimilable” Japanese communities in America. 
Further, there was considerable revulsion against Japan in the United 
States for the bombing of Pearl Harbor.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
referred to the event as a “date which will live in infamy.”61  Numerous 
Americans regarded it as outside the unwritten rules of wartime engagement 
since the United States was not a belligerent at the time the naval base at 
Pearl Harbor was attacked.  Among the negative stereotypes applied to the 
nation of Japan after Pearl Harbor were tendencies to dissemble and to 
exhibit a ruthless disregard for human life.  Sabotage operations among 
“unassimilable” Japanese communities on the West Coast were consistent 
with those stereotypes. 
As for the Court’s toothless standard of review in Korematsu, it was 
actually more searching, at least rhetorically, than the standard the Court had 
employed in Hirabayashi v. United States, decided a year earlier.  Although 
technically the Hirabayashi case only involved a curfew order, not 
evacuation, a unanimous Court concluded that its standard of review of the 
order should be whether there was a rational basis for concluding that the 
curfew was necessary to protect against espionage and sabotage which might 
accompany an invasion.  Even though there had been no evidence of 
sabotage, and even though officials had not advanced any reasons for why 
 
 59.  Id. at 147–49. 
 60.  Substantial German immigration to the British colonies in America had begun by the middle 
of the eighteenth century, and the numbers of German immigrants to the United States increased 
after the widespread political strife in Western Europe in the late 1840s.  Italian immigration to the 
United States began to reach substantial numbers by the 1850s and continued to increase through the 
1920s.  See A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE ITALIAN AMERICANS 27–38 (Wayne Moquin & 
Charles Van Doren eds., 1974); LA VERN J. RIPPLEY, THE GERMAN AMERICANS 72–77 (1976). 
 61.  Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, Address to the Congress Asking That 
a State of War Be Declared Between the United States and Japan (Dec. 8, 1941), reprinted in THE 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 514 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950). 
[Vol. 39: 197, 2011] Determining Notoriety 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
209 
Japanese residents should be singled out among those groups of residents 
that had “ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy,”62 the Court concluded 
that it could not say that the officials were mistaken in thinking that 
requiring Japanese-Americans to remain in their homes from 8:00 p.m. to 
6:00 a.m. was necessary to the war effort.63 
Thus Black’s opinion in Korematsu at least recognized that the supine 
form of review adopted in Hirabayashi gave officials license to selectively 
restrict the activities of racial minorities without having to say why.  Of 
course then after asserting that nothing but the gravest national emergency 
could justify classifications disadvantaging racial minorities, Black blithely 
accepted the same supposed justifications for interning Japanese residents on 
the West Coast that the Hirabayashi opinion had accepted in sustaining the 
curfew order.  But given the fact that the United States and Japan were still 
at war in 1944, when Korematsu was handed down, and that American naval 
supremacy in the Pacific was far from assured at the time, how likely was 
the Supreme Court of the United States to engage in a searching 
investigation of a civil defense strategy designed to protect the West Coast 
from a Japanese invasion? 
Black argued in Korematsu that “[t]o cast this case into outlines of racial 
prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were 
presented, merely confuses the issue.”64  Korematsu, Black claimed, “was 
not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race.  
He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese empire.”65  There 
was no way at the time for civilian or military authorities to gauge the threat 
of a Japanese invasion of the West Coast and little way of predicting the 
response of Japanese residents in America to that prospect.  One could argue 
that Korematsu is one of those decisions that looks far worse in retrospect 
than it did at the time because some contingencies that were part of the basis 
of the decision—an invasion, Japanese-directed sabotage or espionage on 
the West Coast—did not actually occur.  In light of that nonoccurrence, and 
the heightened sensitivity of late twentieth century and twenty-first century 
Americans toward racial classifications, Korematsu has ended up on the 
wrong side of history. 
 The question raised by the above analyses of Dred Scott and Korematsu 
boils down to this: should one conclude that the ranking of previous 
 
 62.  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). 
 65.  Id. 
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decisions by the Court is essentially determined by whether a decision is 
perceived as being on the right or wrong side of history? 
That conclusion seems oversimplified.  Most decisions of the Court 
have a limited doctrinal shelf life.  None of the Marshall Court’s decisions 
interpreting the scope of the Commerce Clause66 or the reach of the 
Contracts Clause67 would be considered authoritative today.  Nor would the 
efforts by late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Courts to 
“prick out the boundary,” in police power and due process cases, between 
permissible and impermissible exercises of the police powers of the states be 
considered authoritative today.68  Nor would the early and mid-twentieth 
century Court’s treatment of obscenity,69 commercial speech,70 or subversive 
advocacy71 be considered authoritative today.  Does doctrinal obsolescence 
in a decision of the Court render it notorious?  The answer would seem to 
be, on the whole, no. 
A recent treatment of the majority opinion in Lochner v. New York can 
serve as an illustration.  That opinion was a candidate for notoriety for 
several years in the middle and late twentieth century, primarily on the 
ground that it employed the discredited judicial doctrine of “liberty of 
contract” to invalidate maximum hours legislation initiated as a health 
measure.  But the majority opinion in Lochner v. New York has been 
“rehabilitated” on the ground that in an era in which Justices were expected 
to engage in pricking the boundary between the police power and private 
rights in due process cases, it rested on the widely held assumption that 
legislative efforts to fix hours in the baking industry were unwarranted, 
paternalistic interferences with the freedom of employees to contract for 
their services.  Furthermore, judicial efforts to attach substantive meaning to 
 
 66.  See Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829); Brown v. 
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
 67.  See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823); Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 518 (1819); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 
U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815); New Jersey v. Wilson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 164 (1812); Fletcher v. Peck, 
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 68.  See Tyson & Brother—United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); 
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Coppage v. 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914); Muller v. 
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45 (1905).  The “pricking out the boundary” language is from Chief Justice Taft’s 
dissenting opinion in Adkins, where he said that in police power and due process cases, Justices 
would be pricking out “[t]he boundary of the police power beyond which its exercise becomes an 
invasion of the guaranty of liberty under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”  Adkins, 261 U.S. 
at 562. 
 69.  See Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 
(1957). 
 70.  See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 
(1942). 
 71.  See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 
(1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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terms such as liberty in the Due Process Clause were then regarded as 
consistent with the judiciary’s role as a guardian of private rights under the 
Constitution.72 
In short, the Lochner majority’s being on the wrong side of history for 
later commentators was not in itself a reason for treating the opinion as 
notorious if it was on the right side of history for contemporaries.  Lochner 
was handed down by a divided Court, with Justice John Marshall Harlan’s 
dissenting opinion also engaging in “boundary pricking,” but concluding 
that the statute establishing maximum hours of work in the baking industry 
could be justified as reasonable exercise of the power to the states to protect 
the health of their citizens.73  Only Holmes’s dissenting opinion suggested 
that “liberty of contract” was an unwarranted judicial gloss, and no 
commentator would endorse that position for another four years.74  It was 
not until 1937 that a majority of the Court would back away from the 
doctrine.75 
In contrast, the Korematsu decision was criticized, as early as six 
months after it was decided, as “hasty, unnecessary and mistaken,” “in no 
way required or justified by the circumstances of the war,” and “calculated 
to produce both individual injustice and deep-seated social maladjustments 
of a cumulative and sinister kind.”76  As for Dred Scott, we have seen that 
criticism of that decision was immediate and widespread, and the election of 
1860 suggested that its holding as to the status of slavery in the federal 
territories would not be enforced by either the Lincoln Administration or 
Congress. 
Thus perceptions about the wrongheadedness of a result can affect 
evaluations of the reasoning accompanying that result and of the institutional 
stance adopted by the Court in the decision, but, taken alone, neither the 
doctrinal obsolescence of an opinion nor the subsequent estrangement of 
commentators from an outcome are enough to ensure notoriety.  It seems to 
 
 72.  See generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011). 
 73.  Lochner, 198 U.S. at 66–71. 
 74.  Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 464 (1909).  For more detail, see G. 
EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 363–65 (1993) 
[hereinafter WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES]. 
 75.  In West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, Chief Justice Hughes, for the Court, said that “[t]he 
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. . . . [R]egulation which is reasonable in relation 
to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process.”  W. Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937). 
 76.  Eugene Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 489 (1945).  
That criticism was echoed in JACOBUS TENBROEK ET AL., PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 
236–41 (4th prtg. 1970). 
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be implicitly acknowledged that the popularity of outcomes reached by the 
Court in its decisions will change over time, and that the shelf life of the 
Court’s constitutional doctrines will be comparatively short.  What seems 
necessary for notoriety is a combination of foundational wrongheadedness 
and transparently defective reasoning, both of which are identified by 
contemporaries of the decision.  On that ground both Dred Scott and 
Korematsu qualify.  Taney’s interpretation of the Territory Clause and his 
conclusion about the “degraded” status of African-Americans at the 
founding were attacked by Justice Benjamin Curtis in his Dred Scott 
dissent77 and numerous commentators in the press at the time.78  Black’s 
rationale for upholding the evacuation order in Korematsu and the general  
treatment of Japanese-Americans by the United States government was 
savaged shortly after the decision was handed down by Yale law professor 
Eugene Rostow.79   
Lochner’s notoriety appears more fleeting.  Commentary on the decision 
when it was handed down was confined to the issue present in all of the 
early twentieth century Court’s police power and due process cases: the 
appropriate boundary line between public power and private rights.80  
Lochner only became “notorious” when, in the late 1930s, redistributive 
social welfare legislation came to be seen as politically and economically 
acceptable and, in part for that reason, the Court began to abandon its 
“boundary pricking” stance in police power cases.  At that point Lochner 
began to look like a decision that combined judicial overreaching with 
support for outmoded theories of political economy.81  But as late twentieth 
century and early twenty-first century Courts have revived aggressive 
scrutiny, even occasionally of legislation affecting social and economic 
transactions, and free market theories of political economy have resurfaced, 
Lochner looks less like a foundationally wrongheaded decision than a 
product of a phase in the Court’s history.82 
What can we conclude from the above exercise?  First, although a 
pernicious outcome is a necessary condition of notoriety in a decision and 
has the capacity to infect analysis of the legal reasoning in that decision, it is 
not a sufficient condition.  Neither is inept legal reasoning, nor an 
indefensibly supine or aggressive review stance.  What seems necessary is a 
 
 77.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 584–88, 624–27 (1857) (Curtis, J., 
dissenting). 
 78.  See sources cited in WARREN, supra note 29, at 302–19. 
 79.  Rostow, supra note 76, at 503–09, 531–33. 
 80.  See WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 75, at 364 nn.65–66. 
 81.  For more detail, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 265–68 
(2000) [hereinafter WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL]. 
 82.  For more detail, see G. EDWARD WHITE, Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny, in HISTORY AND 
THE CONSTITUTION: COLLECTED ESSAYS 136 nn.4–5 (2007) [hereinafter WHITE, HISTORY AND THE 
CONSTITUTION]. 
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combination of all of those qualities, plus a recognition of the decision’s 
notoriety by contemporaries.  The reason this last criterion is important is 
that it serves to wrest the decision from its historical context, thereby 
ascribing to it a kind of transcendental wrongheadedness.  Here we see the 
difference between Dred Scott and the Lochner majority opinions.  The 
former was recognized as an abomination by contemporaries; the latter only 
became “abominable” when mandatory hours and wages legislation came to 
be treated as enlightened, so that scrutiny of that legislation in the name of 
hitherto acknowledged economic liberties against the state fell out of favor.  
Dred Scott shows no signs of losing its status as an abomination.  In 
contrast, the assumptions that drove the critique of the Lochner majority 
now seem as historically driven as those that fueled Lochner itself.83 
IV.  NOTORIETY AND DISCOUNTING FOR HISTORY: CAROLENE PRODUCTS 
I began this analysis by suggesting that since the outcome of a decision 
has a capacity to infect the analysis of the legal reasoning accompanying it, 
or the institutional stance adopted by the Court in it, the process for 
determining notorious decisions runs the risk of becoming overwhelmed by 
subjectivity.  But then another dimension of the process of determining 
notoriety surfaces.  Observation reveals that only a relatively small number 
of decisions have been treated as notorious throughout time.  A much larger 
number of decisions whose outcomes have come to be regarded as 
wrongheaded, and whose reasoning has come to be thought obsolete, have 
escaped being labeled notorious.  This observation suggests that 
commentators do not reflexively ascribe notoriety to decisions with those 
latter characteristics, but tend to be more tolerant of changing historical 
attitudes and more accepting of doctrinal obsolescence than might first 
appear.  What seems to be taking place is an implicit trade-off between 
“discounting for history”—a recognition that since many outcomes and 
much reasoning will seem outmoded with time, obsolescence should not in 
itself stigmatize a decision—and the power of subjective revulsion against 
an outcome.84  Sometimes a decision will seem so wrongheaded that one is 
tempted to call it notorious, but, on further examination, one runs up against 
the fact that most of its contemporaries found the decision unproblematic.85  
 
 83.  This sort of commentary, extending back to the 1980s, is now conventionally referred to as 
“Lochner revisionism.”  See BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 120–22. 
 84.  I use the phrase “discounting for history” in a different context in G. Edward White, 
Neglected Justices: Discounting for History, 62 VAND. L. REV. 319 (2009). 
 85.  Consider, in this vein, two majority decisions written by Justice Holmes: Buck v. Bell, 274 
U.S. 200 (1927) and Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).  The former, which is 
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At that point closer analysis will typically reveal that the reasoning of the 
decision was grounded on starting assumptions which subsequent 
generations have abandoned.  That revelation serves to make the decision 
appear historically contingent rather than transcendentally wrongheaded. 
Two features of the above analysis require some additional discussion.  
The first involves the weight to be assigned to criticism of arguably 
notorious decisions by contemporaries at the time the decisions were handed 
down.  If that criterion is to be made a basis for considering the decisions as 
transcendent mistakes, who counts as critics, and what sort of criticism can 
be deemed sufficiently weighty to label a decision as problematic from the 
moment of its issuance? 
Here one confronts a basic challenge in any sort of historical analysis.  
A historian can never fully exhaust the source material presented by the past, 
nor provide definitive accounts of past events or the attitudes of historical 
actors.  The explicit or implicit selection and presentation of historical data 
is a core function of historical scholarship, and that scholarship carries with 
it a burden of persuading its audiences that the historian’s choices in 
selecting and presenting data have been plausible.  Thus, choosing to 
attribute significance to the criticism of Supreme Court decisions by some 
contemporaries is not different in kind from the choice to give interpretive 
weight to any historical data. 
That said, the process of extracting and analyzing past criticism of 
Supreme Court decisions will invariably privilege those commentators 
whose criticism appears in published sources of some durability, such as 
books, newspapers, journals, legal opinions and commentary, and, in some 
cases, collections of letters.  Contributions to such sources, for most of 
American history, have been primarily the province of literate elites.  Thus, 
in attributing historical significance to such criticism, one is necessarily 
attributing a form of influence to elites and to elite audiences.  This is not to 
suggest that the attitudes of such members of the public should be given 
disproportionate weight, merely to recognize that it has been those members 
that have been able to publicize their opinions widely and to preserve them 
in public records. 
The second feature follows from the fact that what I am calling 
“historical discounting” is a process in which past decisions are not only 
historicized—treated as largely historical documents that are the product of 
the experiences and attitudes of previous generations—but also enlisted, by 
 
treated at length in this symposium, was joined by seven members of the Court, including Justice 
Brandeis and Justice Stone, with only Justice Pierce Butler dissenting without opinion.  The latter, 
laying down the “stop, look, and listen” rule for drivers of vehicles crossing railroad tracks, was 
unanimous.  For symposium articles discussing Buck v. Bell, see Edward J. Larson, Putting Buck v. 
Bell in Scientific and Historical Context: A Response to Victoria Nourse, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 119 
(2011); Victoria Nourse, Buck v. Bell: A Constitutional Tragedy from a Lost World, 39 PEPP. L. 
REV. 101 (2011). 
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current courts and commentators, as present sources of authority.  Just as a 
past decision of the Court is capable of being rendered “obsolete” by 
subsequent generations, it is capable of having its authority enhanced as an 
authoritative precedent or an illustration of some fundamental principle of 
law.   
I want to consider United States v. Carolene Products Co.86 as an 
illustration of this twofold quality of historical discounting.  That decision, 
far from being labeled a notorious mistake, is conventionally thought of as 
remarkably prescient, one in which the Court simultaneously adopted a 
posture of deference in cases reviewing the constitutionality of legislation 
affecting social and economic transactions and laid the groundwork for more 
heightened review where legislation affected the civil rights of minorities.87  
A closer look at Carolene Products, however, suggests that it rested on a set 
of unarticulated and historically contingent starting assumptions. 
Carolene Products challenged the constitutionality of a 1923 
congressional statute prohibiting the shipment in interstate commerce of 
skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat.  The 
Carolene Products Company had manufactured a compound of condensed 
skim milk and coconut oil, called “Milnut,” that resembled condensed milk 
or cream.  The statute declared that “filled milk,” which it defined as any 
milk to which had been added any fat or oil other than butter fat, was “an 
adulterated article of food, injurious to the public health” and “a fraud on the 
public.”88  Violators of the statute were subjected to fines and possible 
imprisonment.  The Carolene Products Company challenged the statute as 
exceeding the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause and 
denying the company equal protection of the laws, as well as depriving it of 
property without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment.  The basis 
for the latter two claims89 was that Congress had not seen fit to apply the 
statute to oleomargarine, a butter substitute in which vegetable fat was 
 
 86.  304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 87.  Carolene Products has been called a “great and modern charter for ordering the relation[s] 
between judges and other agencies of government” and containing “the most celebrated footnote 
[outlining bifurcated review] in constitutional law.”  See Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979); Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982). 
 88.  Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 146, 147. 
 89.  The Commerce Clause issue was doctrinally one-sided, and Justice Stone, writing for a 
majority of the Court (Justice Black joined that portion of Justice Stone’s opinion) easily disposed of 
it.  The company’s argument was that in seeking to regulate public health Congress was invading the 
police powers of the states.  A long line of cases had held that Congress could exclude articles from 
interstate commerce if it reasonably concluded that their use would be injurious to public health, 
even if in so doing its exercise of the commerce power was “attended by the same incidents which 
attend the exercise of the police power of the states.”  Id. at 147. 
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substituted for butter fat, and that no determination had been made that 
Milnut was actually injurious to public health. 
Prior to Carolene Products, a federal or state statute challenged on 
constitutional grounds would typically have been subjected to the uniform 
level of scrutiny adopted by the Court in such cases, in which no 
presumption of constitutionality was afforded to the statute.90  Had that level 
of scrutiny been undertaken, Congress would have needed to establish that 
Milnut was in fact dangerous to public health, by way of negating the 
possibility that the legislation was not a health measure at all, but an 
illustration of effective lobbying by producers of whole milk who sought to 
retard competition from less expensive milk substitutes.91  Justice Stone, 
however, referred to a “presumption of constitutionality” when the Court 
reviewed challenged legislation, subsequently adding that,  
[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions 
is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the 
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as 
to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis 
within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.92  
He cited two cases in support of those claims, neither of which provided 
independent support for them.93 
Once the presumption of constitutionality and his “rational basis” 
standard of review were in place, Justice Stone suggested, it would have 
been enough that Congress had declared “filled milk” products lacking in 
butter fat to be injurious to the public health even if it had not stated a 
reason, because the Court could derive a rational basis for the legislation 
from the declaration itself.94  But Congress had held hearings and made 
 
 90.  See WHITE, HISTORY AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 82, at 135. 
 91.  A study of the legislation in Carolene Products has concluded that the statute was the result 
of a lobby effort by milk producers rather than a health measure.  Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story 
of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397, 398–99. 
 92.  Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152. 
 93.  The first of those cases, Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell, another 
Stone opinion, stated that “the burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests 
on him who assails it,” with no supporting citations.  Metro. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 
U.S. 580, 584 (1934).  The second case, State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, only 
stated that in cases of taxation, states could make distinctions among classes of trades or 
businesses so long as they were not arbitrary or capricious.  State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs v. 
Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 537 (1931).  Taken together, the cases did not provide support for 
Justice Stone’s claim that legislation affecting “ordinary commercial transactions” should be 
presumed to be constitutional. 
 94.  As Stone put it, 
There is no need to consider [the statute’s assertions that filled milk was injurious to 
public health and its sale a fraud on the public] as more than a declaration of the 
legislative findings deemed to support and justify the action . . . .  Even in the absence of 
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reports in connection with the Filled Milk Act, and its committees had based 
their conclusions that filled milk was injurious to public health on the 
testimony of experts that “[b]utter fat, which constitutes an important part of 
the food value of pure milk, is rich in vitamins, food elements which are 
essential to proper nutrition.”95  Those elements were “wanting in vegetable 
oils.”96  The use of filled milk as a dietary substitute for pure milk thus 
resulted, “especially in the case of children, in undernourishment [which] 
induces diseases that attended malnutrition.”97 
When one looks closely at Justice Stone’s opinion in Carolene 
Products, it becomes clear how much work was being done by his 
presumption of constitutionality and his endorsement of a rational basis 
standard of review for “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial 
transactions.”98  Those devices enabled him to avoid the critical question in 
the case, whether Congress could prohibit shipments of Milnut in interstate 
commerce without a specific finding that Milnut was injurious to public 
health.  A more searching scrutiny of the Filled Milk Act might have 
resulted in the Court concluding that a complete prohibition on interstate 
sales of Milnut, based only on the supposition that products containing 
vegetable oil were less nutritious than those containing butter fat, was a 
deprivation of property without due process, especially since that prohibition 
had not been extended to oleomargarine.99 
Even if one assumes that Congress had decided to start off by 
prohibiting sales of filled milk, which could be made to look and taste very 
much like whole milk, and might get around to prohibiting sales of 
oleomargarine (at the time more easily distinguishable from butter), the idea 
 
such aids the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed . . . . 
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152. 
 95.  Id. at 149 n.2. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id.  Justice Stone added, “There is now an extensive literature indicating wide recognition by 
scientists and dietitians of the great importance to the public health of butter fat and whole milk as 
the prime source of vitamins, which are essential growth producing and disease preventing elements 
in the diet.”  Id. at 150 n.3. 
 98.  Id. at 152. 
 99.  That argument presupposed an “equal protection” dimension to the Fifth Amendment, 
despite its lacking an Equal Protection Clause.  The presupposition, well established in early 
twentieth century constitutional jurisprudence, was that in some instances federal legislation 
establishing unjustifiable discriminations among classes of persons could amount to denials of due 
process.  Stone responded to that argument by stating that “[a] legislature may hit at an abuse which 
it has found, even though it has failed to strike at another,” and the decision as to “whether 
commerce in filled milk should be left unregulated, or in some measure restricted, or wholly 
prohibited” was up to Congress.  Id. at 151, 154. 
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that butter fat was more nutritious in a diet (or even that it contained more 
vitamins than vegetable oil) would certainly be contested by some 
contemporary theories of nutrition.  Thus the entire premise of the 
legislation, that milk products containing coconut oil were injurious to 
public health in a manner that milk products containing butter fat or butter 
substitutes containing vegetable oil were not, appears suspect.  Heightened 
scrutiny of the Filled Milk Act might have revealed that producers of 
oleomargarine, in addition to producers of whole milk, had been more 
effective lobbyists than producers of filled milk. 
The last feature worth noting about Carolene Products is that the 
portion of Justice Stone’s opinion declaring that legislation regulating 
“ordinary commercial transactions” 100 should be presumed constitutional if 
grounded on a rational basis was not endorsed by a majority of the Court.  
Of the nine Justices on the Court when Carolene Products was handed 
down, two, Justice Cardozo and Justice Reed, took no part because their 
appointments had taken place after the case had been argued.  Of the seven 
remaining, Justice McReynolds dissented, Justice Butler concurred in the 
result, and Justice Black concurred in all of Justice Stone’s opinion “except 
the part marked ‘Third,’”101 the portion in which Justice Stone announced 
the presumption of constitutionality for legislation regulating “ordinary 
commercial transactions.”  Thus, Stone’s decision to adopt a posture of 
rational basis review for an indefinite number of cases involving legislation 
regulating economic activity or redistributing economic benefits was 
endorsed only by Justices Hughes, Brandeis, and Roberts.  And since 
footnote four of Carolene Products, for which the opinion has been most 
celebrated, was also in the portion Justice Black disclaimed, there was also 
no majority for the suggestions in that footnote that heightened scrutiny 
might be reserved for other sets of cases, including those involving 
legislative “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”102 
In sum, a close reading of Carolene Products seems compatible with 
several conclusions.  First, the Court gave little attention to the possibility 
that the Filled Milk Act, as a health measure, was based on scanty evidence 
about the health effects of milk products made with vegetable oil.  
Additionally, the Court altered the standard of review for legislation 
regulating “ordinary commercial transactions,” shifting it from a more 
heightened form of scrutiny, hitherto uniform across a range of cases, to 
rational basis scrutiny, and it provided no basis for that change other than 
unsupported language in an earlier opinion by Stone.  Finally, at the same 
time, the Court invented a “presumption of constitutionality” for “ordinary 
 
 100.  Id. at 152. 
 101.  Id. at 155. 
 102.  Id. at 153 n.4. 
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commercial transactions” legislation, in that instance providing no support 
whatsoever. 
The Court’s innovations affecting its standard of review in Carolene 
Products would play a substantial role in the development of its 
constitutional jurisprudence over the next several decades.  On the whole, 
commentators have been supportive of a review posture that has had the 
effect of sustaining most challenges to the legislative regulation of 
commercial transactions and made it more difficult for legislatures to restrict 
civil rights, especially those of minorities.  It may not be too much to claim 
that the bifurcated review initiated by Carolene Products was the Court’s 
chief response to the argument, increasingly fashionable after World War II, 
that any effort on the part of an unelected group of nine Justices to second-
guess the policy decisions of elected branches of government was “counter-
majoritarian” and therefore inconsistent with democratic theory.103  One 
commentator referred to the Warren Court, which overruled legislation 
establishing racial classifications, apportioned seats in state legislatures on 
grounds other than population, and required prayers in public schools, as a 
“Carolene Products Court.”104 
But one could argue that the celebrated status of Carolene Products has 
come almost entirely from being on the right side of history, the side in 
which members of current generations enlist past decisions as support for 
policies they endorse in the present.  On the whole, middle and late twentieth 
century Americans favored legislation regulating economic activity and 
redistributing economic benefits, while at the same time demonstrating 
increased support for civil liberties and heightened concern about 
discrimination based on race, religion, national origin, and gender.  The 
bifurcated review posture prefigured in Carolene Products reinforced those 
policies. 
Yet there did not seem to be any compelling legal reason for the 
Carolene Products Court to adopt its posture of bifurcated review.  Prior to 
the early twentieth century the Court made no effort to condition the degree 
of scrutiny it afforded legislation challenged on constitutional grounds on 
the subject matter of the legislation.  The “boundary pricking” posture 
 
 103.  That argument is often associated with Alexander Bickel’s 1962 book, The Least Dangerous 
Branch, which coined the phrase “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962).  
Bickel’s phrase is best understood as the encapsulation of arguments that had emerged in law review 
commentary over the preceding two decades.  For illustrations, see the sources cited in G. EDWARD 
WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 91–99 (2010). 
 104.  John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 5 
(1978). 
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adopted by late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Courts was 
employed in cases where legislatures restricted noneconomic as well as 
economic “liberties.”105  Boundary pricking presupposed that the Court 
would be an active guardian of individual rights, whether the rights in 
question derived from the Constitution’s protection for property or for 
freedom of speech.  On numerous occasions late nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century Courts sustained legislation as an appropriate 
exercise of the power to regulate public health, safety, or morals; on other 
occasions they invalidated the legislation.  Pricking out the boundary 
between public power and private rights was assumed to be a central 
function of the judicial branch under the Constitution. 
The idea that judicial glosses such as “liberty of contract” were 
impermissible substitutions of the economic theories of judges for those of 
more representative institutions emerged when the established nineteenth 
century conception of judging as an exercise in finding and declaring a body 
of preexisting legal principles was undermined by modernist theories of 
causal agency, which posited that “law” was synonymous with the policies 
of its interpreters, so that judges were simply another species of 
policymakers.  Once modernist conceptions of judging became prominent, 
the “difficulty” that Supreme Court Justices were substituting their policy 
views for those of more majoritarian legislatures emerged.106 
A deferential theory of judicial review was consistent with those 
conceptions of judging because it ostensibly limited the ability of judges to 
make policy decisions in the guise of constitutional interpretation, thereby 
ensuring that policy would be made by more majoritarian institutions.  But 
the logic of modernist theories of judging supported deferential review in all 
cases.  Carolene Products review was not uniformly deferential, but 
bifurcated.  The retention of a heightened standard of review for certain 
cases suggested that certain noneconomic liberties were simply being given 
greater priority.  In the wake of Carolene Products, one of the rationales for 
heightened review in free speech and freedom of religion cases that surfaced 
on the Court in the 1940s was that freedom of expression occupied a 
“preferred position” among constitutional rights in a democratic society 
because of its close connection to participatory government.107 
So the best explanation for the appearance of Carolene Products review 
in the late 1930s and 1940s is that it fit comfortably with modernist 
 
 105.  For example, the Court concluded that police power statutes infringed on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “liberties” to learn foreign languages and direct the upbringing of children.  See 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–36 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–03 
(1923). 
 106.  The relationship of deferential and bifurcated review to modernist theories of causal agency 
and modernist conceptions of judging is discussed in more detail in WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE NEW DEAL, supra note 81, at 165–236. 
 107.  For more detail, see id. at 143–52. 
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conceptions of judging and policies that favored legislative regulation of 
economic activity and disfavored legislative restrictions on certain civil 
rights, notably freedom of speech and religion.  Over time, as cases 
involving racial segregation heightened attention to legislative 
discrimination against the civil rights of racial and ethnic minorities, 
paragraphs two and three of footnote four in Carolene Products, which 
suggested that heightened scrutiny might be called for when legislation was 
directed against powerless “discrete and insular minorities,” came to be 
emphasized as well.108  None of those developments were based on a 
provision of the Constitution or some other authoritative legal source.  They 
were simply ways of accommodating judicial review to modernist theories 
of the judicial function, diminished support for the primacy of economic 
rights, and a heightened concern for the civil liberties of minorities. 
Thus, one could see the features of Carolene Products that both drove 
the outcome in that case and ushered in the bifurcated standard of review as 
largely the products of Stone’s problematic reasoning, but at the same time 
on the right side of history because they were culturally resonant.  Stone and 
many of his fellow Justices wanted to get the Court out of the business of 
boundary pricking in police power cases so that Congress and the states 
could get on with the regulatory and redistributive legislation that seemed 
appropriate for a damaged economy.  Moreover, in an age where totalitarian 
governments were emerging across the globe, members of the Stone Court 
did not want to leave religious and political minorities wholly at the mercy 
of legislative majorities.  Carolene Products review facilitated both those 
goals.  But at the same time it was a departure from the Court’s long-
established posture of judicial review, and a departure that had been 
fashioned on the slimmest of legal authorities. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Few persons would be inclined to ascribe notoriety to Carolene 
Products.  But a close analysis of that decision serves to highlight the 
balance between a substantive appraisal of outcomes and discounting for 
history that is at the heart of the process of labeling a decision “notorious.”  
If one focuses on the way in which Stone arrived at the outcome in Carolene 
Products, the decision appears to turn on a largely unsupported reversal of 
the Court’s traditional standard of review of constitutionally challenged 
legislation, resulting in supine deference to the questionable findings about 
nutrition used by Congress to buttress arguably pretextual legislation.  If, on 
 
 108.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). 
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the other hand, one focuses on the emergence of modernist theories of law 
and judging in the early twentieth century and the mainstream political and 
economic attitudes of Americans in the late 1930s, the decision seems 
historically resonant in a quite powerful fashion.  Carolene Products turns 
out to be a case in which the twofold effect of discounting for history reveals 
itself: the resonance of a decision to later generations serves to increase its 
stature and to downplay its problematic features.  
Notoriety thus seems reserved for those decisions where historical 
discounting is neither sufficient to overcome the stigma associated with their 
outcomes, nor to ameliorate difficulties with their legal reasoning or their 
institutional posture.  The reason comparatively few decisions end up in the 
category of transcendent mistakes is that, in most cases, examination of the 
historical context of decisions serves to provide evidence of why they 
seemed plausible to contemporaries, if not necessarily plausible to 
subsequent generations.  Moreover, in some instances, as Carolene Products 
illustrates, the subsequent resonance of decisions can serve to minimize their 
shaky analytical foundations. 
Closer analysis of the qualities previously identified with notorious 
decisions has shown that the outcomes reached in cases have a way of 
infecting reactions to the legal analysis employed by the Courts who reach 
them and the institutional stances reflected in the decisions.  Dred Scott’s 
conclusion that the federal government was powerless to eradicate slavery in 
federal territories was regarded as sufficiently pernicious to place Taney’s 
interpretations of the Territory Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause under searching scrutiny, and both of those readings have 
been severely criticized.  Moreover, Dred Scott’s effort to fashion a 
definitive resolution of the constitutional status of slavery in all the newly 
acquired territory of the United States has invited criticism of the Taney 
Court for reaching out to resolve that issue when its resolution was not 
necessary to the central question in the case, whether a person of African-
American descent could sue in the federal courts of the United States. 
One could argue that all that criticism of Dred Scott can be associated 
with the fact that the decision, which legitimated slavery in federal territories 
and suggested that the federal government could never abolish it, was on the 
wrong side of history.  But when a historical discount is applied to Dred 
Scott, it does not serve as a substantial counterweight to the perniciousness 
of the decision because numerous contemporaries reacted to the outcome 
with revulsion and criticized it on legal and policy grounds.  Thus the typical 
role historical discounting plays in the evaluation of cases, to demonstrate 
how retrospective criticism of a decision is often a function of altered 
attitudes about public policy rather than some transcendent 
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wrongheadedness in the decision itself, is not present in notorious cases.109  
Contemporaries of those decisions can be enlisted to show that they were 
regarded as pernicious and flawed at the time they were handed down. 
If one employs the criteria for notoriety outlined in this article, one 
would expect the number of notorious Supreme Court decisions, those 
whose wrongheadedness is of sufficient magnitude to transcend their 
historical contexts, to be small.  That seems appropriate if a substantial 
historical discount is to be applied to decisions of the Court.  Given that the 
doctrinal shelf life of most Court decisions is comparatively short, that 
attitudes toward the role of Supreme Court Justices as social and political 
actors have changed dramatically over time, and that so many features of 
American society once taken as beyond dispute have subsequently been 
revealed as historically contingent, such a discount seems necessary if the 
bulk of the Court’s decisions are to be properly understood.  Discounting 
most of the Court’s “obsolete” decisions also has the effect of shining a 
brighter light on its transcendent mistakes, the decisions for which the Court  
gets no historical discount.  By ascribing notoriety to those decisions, we 
remind ourselves that although judges, like other humans, are mainly 
creatures of their historical circumstances, they are also occasionally capable 
of making mistakes that can span the ages. 
  
 
 109.  Cf. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).  This case was overruled seven 
years after it was decided, and whose “stop, look, and listen” rule for vehicles crossing railroad 
tracks has long been regarded as nonsensical.  The Goodman case was unanimous, possibly because 
having a uniform rule establishing a standard of care in grade crossing cases meant that few of those 
cases, which typically came to the Court as diversity of citizenship cases on appeal from the lower 
federal courts in a setting in which the contributory negligence of an injured driver would be a 
complete bar to recovery, would show up on the Court’s docket.  Plaintiffs in grade crossing cases 
would only be able to recover if they followed the “stop, look, and listen” formula and then were 
injured by the railroad’s negligence.  Given the number of railroad crossings without gates and the 
much smaller number of motor vehicles in use at the time, any rule establishing a uniform standard 
of care for grade crossing accidents would reduce the number of cases brought. 
  Further, the “stop, look, and listen” rule arguably made more sense in a setting with light 
traffic, because the features of the rule that subsequently resulted in its being abandoned—drivers 
having potentially to get out of cars, thereby running the risk of encountering other vehicle traffic, in 
efforts to learn of an approaching train that might have come upon them in the interval when they 
returned to their cars—were less otherworldly if one assumed that at most crossings only a few cars 
would be passing over railroad tracks, and those in a single line. 
  Goodman was thus a case where the Supreme Court decided that laying down a uniform 
standard of care for grade crossing accidents would create disincentives for injured persons to sue 
out-of-state railroad corporations in the federal courts.  Given the Court’s jurisdiction at the time 
Goodman was handed down, the decision seemed to be one of practical utility.  It rested, however, 
on an imperfect understanding of the behavior of drivers at grade crossings, and thus ended up on the 
wrong side of history.  Under the analysis employed in this article, that fact alone does not suffice to 
make the Goodman decision notorious. 
 224 
*** 
